



Targeted Attack

APT

Advanced threats

Abnormal Behavior

Internal threats

BANKING THREATS IN DEPTH

BANKS ARE UNDER ATTACK 2016

Sergey Lozhkin
Senior Security Researcher
Kaspersky Lab Italia

GREAT: ELITE THREAT RESEARCH



- Global Research and Analysis Team, since 2008
- Threat intelligence, research and innovation leadership
- Focus: APTs, critical infrastructure threats, banking threats, sophisticated targeted attacks

IN 2014...WE PREDICTED AND WE WERE RIGHT

Escalation of ATM and PoS attacks

Attacks against cash machines (ATM) seemed to explode this year with several public incidents and a rush to law enforcement authorities globally to respond to this crisis. A corollary of this publicity is an awareness that ATMs are ripe for the taking and cybercriminals are sure to notice. As most of these systems are running Windows XP and also suffer from frail physical security, they are incredibly vulnerable by default and, as the impersonal gatekeepers of the financial institutions' cash, cybercriminals are bound to come knocking here first.



The next stage will see attackers compromising the networks of banks to manipulate #ATM machines in real time

Tweet

The Great Bank Robbery: the Carbanak APT

Further evolution of these ATM attacks with the use of APT techniques to gain access to ATM machines. The next stage will see attackers compromising the networks of banks to gain access to manipulate ATM machines in real time.

By [GReAT](#) on February 16, 2015. 4:20 pm


THEY STARTED OPERATIONS WORLDWIDE



CASES 2015-2016

- CARBANAK 2.0
- METEL (RUSSIAN BANKS)
- GCMAN (MOSTLY RUSSIAN BANKS)
- CARBANAK 2.0 (WORLDWIDE)
- UNKNOWN (BANGLADESH)

SPEARFISHING – STILL NUMBER 1



CONTROL FINANCES

LEGITIMATE TOOLS

- PUTTY (WHITELISTED)
- VNC
- METERPRETER(IN POWERSHELL)
- AMMY
- MIMIKATZ (IN POWERSHELL)

MONEY EXFILTRATION

- ONLINE BANKING
- E-PAYMENT SYSTEMS
- INFLATING ACCOUNT BALANCES
- DATABASE MANIPULATION
- CONTROLLING ATM'S

CARBANAK 2.0


- Attacks in budget deps
- Change registration data of shareholders' in depository

How the Carbanak cybergang targets financial organizations

1. Infection



100s of machines infected in search of the admin PC



2. Harvesting Intelligence

Intercepting the clerks' screens



3. Mimicking the staff


How the money was stolen



METEL – TRANSACTIONS ROLLBACK



GCMAN – 200\$ PER MINUTE AUTOSCRIPT




200 USD PER MINUTE

```
root@payments ~ #  
root@payments ~ # crontab -l  
# crontab for root  
* * * * * /bin/snitch_some_money  
root@payments ~ #  
root@
```

1.5 YEARS

- 70 internal hosts
- 56 accounts
- 139 attack sources:
TOR and home routers

GCMAN ATTACK



Ads
Web
Server


Corporate
online
banking
webserver

Online
banking
DB

Admin's
Workstations

Processing
Connection
Server

ATM INFECTOR




ATM INFECTOR –XFS SERVICE PATCH

```
.00402036: 6A28          push     028 ; '('
.00402038: 68A0384000   push     0004038A0 --|1
.0040203D: E8FA010000   call    .00040223C --|2
.00402042: 33FF        xor     edi,edi
.00402044: 57          push     edi
.00402045: FF1588304000 call    GetModuleHandleA
.0040204B: 6681384D5A   cmp     w,[eax],05A4D ; 'ZM'
.00402050: 751F        jnz     .000402071 --|3
.00402052: 8B483C      mov     ecx,[eax][03C]
.00402055: 03C8      add     ecx,eax
.00402057: 813950450000 cmp     d,[ecx],000004550 ; ' EP'
.0040205D: 7512        jnz     .000402071 --|3
.0040205F: 0FB74118   movzx  eax,w,[ecx][018]
.00402063: 3D0B010000   cmp     eax,00000010B
.00402068: 741F        jz      .000402089 --|4
.0040206A: 3D0B020000   cmp     eax,00000020B
.0040206F: 7405        jz      .000402076 --|5
.00402071: 897DE4      3mov   [ebp][-01C],edi
.00402074: EB27        jmps   .00040209D --|6
.00402076: 83B984000000E scmp   d,[ecx][000000084],00E
```


ATM INFECTOR –MAGIC CARD

CARD 1 – INTERFACE COMMANDS

CARD 2 – TRACK 2 HARDCODED



THANK YOU!

Sergey Lozhkin
Senior Security Researcher
Kaspersky Lab

